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why it fell short of his greatest expectations.
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ABSTRACT:
By passing the Federal Highway Act of 1956, 34th U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower would
go down in history as the father of the American Interstate Highway System. It was Ike’s
determination to push his ‘Grand Plan’ for a modernized road network that set in motion the
monumental effort to produce the roads we as Americans use every day. However, today’s
highway network is a far cry from what Ike had in mind when he first envisioned the plan.
Congressional dissent and special interests did much to undermine the success of Ike’s ‘Grand
Plan,’ which forced him to compromise significantly on the issue. Through an analysis of Ike’s
motivations, actions, and rhetoric surrounding the Interstate Highway effort as president of the
United States from 1953-1960, I will demonstrate what Ike thought of the road network he
initiated, and why it fell short of his greatest expectations.

1
If you live in America, it is close to impossible to envision a life without easy access to a
network of interstate highways. No matter who you are or where you live, you have probably
driven on at least one stretch of the 46,876 mile Interstate Highway System that covers the
nation.1 Some roads span nearly the entire stretch of the country, like Interstate 90, which runs
from Boston to Seattle. Others can barely be seen on a map of the continental U.S., like the 12
mile stretch from Greensboro to Emery, North Carolina, called Interstate 73.2 Big and small,
each road taps into a gargantuan system that binds our nation together, figuratively and literally.
For better or for worse, the Interstate Highway System has profound impacts on our way
of life. Millions of Americans use these roads every day to commute to work, visit relatives,
access vacation destinations, run errands, or even simply take their kids to school. Today’s
consumer culture that has grown accustomed to lightning fast shipping times of a week or less
would be a complete impossibility without this infrastructure. Because almost every aspect of
our life--from what we do, to who we see, to where we are, and where we are going to be--is
affected by these roads, it is easy for the average American to grasp their significance. What is
not as apparent to the average American, however, is how this system--formally known as The
Dwight D. Eisenhower National System of Interstate and Defense Highways--came to be, and
what the story of its creation tells about the man who’s name it bears.
The Interstate Highway System, set in motion by the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1956,
was the culmination of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s sustained effort to construct, “a
properly articulated system that solves the problems of speedy, safe, transcontinental travel intercity communication - access highways - and farm-to-market movement - metropolitan area
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congestion - bottlenecks - and parking.”3 The act authorized $25 billion for twelve years to
accelerate construction of a National System of Interstate and Defense Highways that had been
set in motion years earlier, and required that the interstate highways be built with the capability
of handling traffic projected for 1972--the date by which construction of the system was to be
completed.4
Scholarly opinion has been largely positive towards the Interstate Highway System.
Some have gone as far as to say that the U.S. Interstate Highways System was, “the best
investment a nation ever made.”5 And, while that contention is not widely accepted, most would
agree with historian Tom Lewis, who believes that the Federal-aid Highway Act of 1956 takes its
place, “beside the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as two of the most important domestic federal
measures of the second half of the twentieth century.”6
The Interstate Highway System was popular from the start.7 However, when comparing
both Ike’s initial goals for the project and his broader principles of governance with the outcomes
produced by the legislative action, one wonders if he would assess his principal domestic legacy
so flatteringly. For a man with conservative leanings on issues like states rights and fiscal policy,
it is surprising that a series of Federal-aid Highway Acts issued, amended, and ultimately
approved under the Eisenhower administration between 1954 and 1960 produced “the most
massive public works project in American history,” almost entirely paid for and coordinated by
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the Federal Government.8 In order to understand how and why events developed in this way, one
must understand the motivations behind Ike’s decision to construct a better highway system, and
the factors at play before and during his effort to do so. Ultimately the legislation that produced
the highway system can be attributed to his proclivity to delegate important decisions to trusted
members of his administration, his willingness to compromise for the sake of the country, and his
unwavering conviction that America needed better roads, and needed them fast.

When Dwight Eisenhower first announced his decision to construct a more complete and
connected network of roads, it probably did not come as a surprise to many. Ever since the first
Federal-aid Highway Act was enacted on July 11, 1916, a coordinated federal-state effort had
been underway to improve the nation's roads. The popularity of the automobile at the start of the
20th century, particularly after Henry Ford introduced the low-priced Model T in 1908, had
created a transportation boom that necessitated better driving conditions.9 At the time, the
majority of the roadways in America were governed by “terrain, existing indian trails, cattle
trails, (and) arbitrary section lines” that were “designed largely for local movement at low speeds
of one or two horsepower.”10 The 1916 Act was the first of its kind aimed at improving these
conditions, and did so by allocating federal funds to subsidize road-building efforts undertaken
by the state governments.11 The states, aware of the demand--and indeed desperate need--for
safer, more robust roads, quickly got on board with this action. By the following year, every state

8
Jean Edward Smith, “Chapter 28: Electing a President” in Lucius D. Clay : an American Life (New York City:
Henry Holt, 1990), n.p.
9
Richard F. Weingroff, "From 1916 to 1939: The Federal-State Partnership at Work," Public Roads 60, no. 1,
Federal Highway Administration (1996), n.p.
10
Address of Vice President Richard Nixon to the Governors Conference Lake George.
11
Richard Weingroff, "From 1916 to 1939,” n.p.

4
in the U.S. had a highway agency dedicated to acquiring, apportioning, and directing federal
funds.12
For the next three decades, the federal government, state governments, private industries,
and citizens of the United States increasingly perceived the need for a more interconnected and
streamlined system of roads. The outbreak of World War I, along with the legislation’s small
appropriation and its limit on federal funding to $10,000 per mile, hampered the proper
implementation of the 1916 Act. 13 It soon became clear that the federal government would have
to implement more robust measures to accommodate the exponentially increasing demand for
more roads of better quality. Such was the climate from which the Federal-Aid Highway Act of
1921 emerged. The act doubled the limit of federal participation in road costs per mile from the
1916 measure.14 But not even this was enough to keep up with the blinding increase in the
number of drivers on American roads. In 1921, there were 10.5 million motor vehicles registered
in the United States. By the end of the decade, this number more than doubled, with 26.5 million
drivers actively using the roads.15 This boom coincided with, and essentially necessitated, “the
great highway boom.” This term describes an explosion in the production of new road networks
“that began in 1921, continued unabated through the Great Depression, (and) came to an end
amidst the mobilization for the Second World War.” 16
The 1921 Act had successfully accomplished its purpose to get portions of the federal-aid
system in the greatest disrepair up to par with the rest of the system.17 By 1929 contractors had
improved 90 percent of the federal-aid system, or about 170k miles of roads.18 Soon however,
12
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deficiencies in the level of funds, construction methods, and restrictions on road construction of
all but rural roads rendered the 1921 Act obsolete. As motor vehicle manufacturers continued to
increase production year after year, the driving public demanded more roads with greater
capabilities and connectivity. Congress understood this. It responded with the Hayden-Cartwright
Act of 1934, which eliminated the restriction of federal fund application for all roads other than
rural.19 Thereafter, the states enlarged their federal-aid systems to earmark funds for both
extension of federal-aid routes into and through their major cities, and for construction of
entirely new routes within suburban areas. More importantly, the Hayden-Cartwright Act
allowed the states to divert funds to an area of increasing interest -- highway systems connecting
rural populations.20 Whereas previously the main efforts of federal road legislation was focused
on improving previously existing roads, the 1934 Act acknowledged that this was not enough.
Existing roads were all too often narrow and crooked, making them unsafe for high speed travel.
The Hayden-Cartwright Act shifted federal and state focus away from these existing roads and
onto the construction of new roads that were specifically designated for high speed travel over
long distances.21 The highway effort was underway.22
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Although the Hayden-Cartwright Act made great strides in the emergence of a
comprehensive American highway network, the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1944 is more
commonly cited as the foundational legislation for the Interstate Highway System.23 The Act was
formed when federal road planners proposed the construction of a single integrated Interstate
Highway System, with “common design standards and limited access, bypassing congested
small-town America and allowing cars and trucks to move faster and farther.” 24 The resulting
legislation specifically earmarked $125 million annually for each year from 1945 to 1948 for the
construction of urban roads and highways. It also authorized a limited 40,000-mile network of
roads spanning across multiple states--thereby establishing the National System of Interstate
Highways.25 Indeed, the 1944 Act was a significant step toward the eventual construction of the
Interstate Highway System. However, the act was passed without any provision for construction
funds, resulting in a bill that was conceptually ground-breaking but practically ineffectual. It
would not be until The Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1952 that funds would actually be dedicated
to the system. Even then, the allotted amount was not nearly enough to support the massive
undertaking. The federal government only put up $25 million for the system on a 50-50 matching
basis with the states.26
The ever growing number of affordable, fast moving automobiles that began in the 1910s
and continued through the following four decades necessitated a more comprehensive network of
roads. The federal and state governments in the United States attempted to meet this demand
with multiple pieces of road and highway legislation, each of which called for more funds and
23
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greater connectivity than the last. Yet all had ultimately proved insufficient. Now, the
responsibility for interstate highway production that began under Franklin D. Roosevelt and
passed on to Harry Truman now made its way to Dwight Eisenhower’s feet. But although Ike’s
demand for a “modern, efficient highway system”27 was just the latest in a long line of similar
pleas, few had the intimate knowledge Ike possessed of why they were so important, and few
possessed the particular motivations for their production that made his argument so effective.
Ike’s experiences prior to assuming the presidency in 1953 had shaped his understanding of why
our country needed better roads, and how an interstate highway system should be constructed
and operated.

Some writers have suggested that Ike’s understanding of the need to improve automobile
transportation first developed as the result of growing up in the railroad town of Abilene,
Kansas.28 However, most historians, and Eisenhower himself, would say that it actually began on
July 7th, 1919.29 It was on that day that Second Lieutenant Dwight Eisenhower embarked on the
transcontinental military convoy. The convoy's official purpose was to road-test various Army
vehicles in a way that would “prove that the gas engine had displaced the mule,”30 as well as to
assess how difficult it would be to move an entire army across the North American continent. 31
At the time, Eisenhower tagged along, “partly for a lark and partly to learn.”32 Little did he know
at the time that this excursion would irrevocably alter his views on the U.S. transportation
network, and thus the course of history. It was not long after the 81-vehicle convoy departed
27
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from Washington, D.C. and headed across the country for San Francisco that the inadequacies of
the American road network became fully apparent. Breakdowns occurred constantly; frequent
stops had to be made to clear debris off the poorly maintained roads of the Lincoln Highway; at
one point, the convoy came across
roads so narrow, steep, and
dilapidated that multiple trucks fell
off the road and rolled to the foot of
a mountain.33 During one three day
stretch, the convoy “spent 29 hours
on the road and moved 165 miles...at
an average speed of about five and
two-thirds miles an hour”34 due to
the exceedingly poor conditions of the roads. 62 days, 3,251 miles, and 6000 breakdowns later,
the convoy arrived in San Francisco.35 After such a long and arduous journey, as Eisenhower
himself recalled, “I think that every officer on the convoy had recommended in his report that
efforts should be made to get our people interested in producing better roads.”36 Central to
Eisenhower’s convoy experience was the contact he had with the people in the towns they visited
along the way. At many points, Ike would stop and chat with the locals, and try his best to retain
some of the advice, concern, and information they imparted.37 At the time, all-weather roads in
the United States totaled 300 thousand miles, driven on by 7.6 million registered motor
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vehicles.38 On the convoy, as Ike met with some of these drivers in distant villages and shared
their perilous experiences driving on the surrounding roads, he began to understand that every
American needed and deserved “better main highways.”39
For the years following the 1919 transcontinental convoy, Ike would be consumed by
events that would make him into a man that could be trusted by the American people. It is not
likely that the failings and needs of the American road network loomed large in Ike’s mind while
studying under the tutelage of Fox Conner at Camp Gaillard, advising General Douglas
Macarthur in the Philippines, or conducting the Louisiana Maneuvers. However, it would not be
long after Ike became Supreme Allied Commander in Europe that roads would once again pique
the interest of the future president. After the successful invasion of the European continent in the
Summer of 1944, the Allies quickly went on to the next stage of of their plan--the liberation of
Western European countries under Nazi control, and the eventual invasion of the German
homeland. Once victory was at hand, Ike went to visit and congratulate the U.S. troops that had
broken through the German lines. To do so, he used the German Autobahn, a federal system of
highways in Germany which had begun construction in the 1930s.40 Despite the massive craters
peppering the road system (courtesy of the Allied bombing campaign), Ike was able to travel
with relative ease across the German homeland. Ike instantly saw the value of such a system.
Surely, Ike had marveled at the speed at which the Nazi army was able to move throughout
Germany. Now, he understood. Ike also understood something else--the U.S. could benefit
tremendously from a highway system of such quality and scale. “After seeing the autobahns of
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modern Germany and knowing the asset those highways were to the Germans,” he said, “I
decided, as president, to put an emphasis on this kind of road building.”41
The unique experiences Ike underwent both as a part of the 1919 convoy and in Germany
as Supreme Allied Commander in the aftermath of WWII had a profound impact on his
understanding of roads and highways. The convoy demonstrated the deficiencies of the
American road system, Ike’s observation of the Autobahn suggested the potential value of an
excellent network of roads. Reflecting on these experiences, Ike himself noted, “the old convoy
had started me thinking about good, two-lane highways, but Germany had made me see the
wisdom of broader ribbons across the land.”42 Ike would cite the 1919 convoy and his World War
II experiences to persuade Congress to enact legislation to create the Interstate Highway System.
However, neither event adequately explains why, as president, Eisenhower placed highway
construction programs “at the top of (his) legislative list.”43 Ike actually had several practical,
political, and economic reasons to propose an interstate highway construction effort during his
presidency. In order to evaluate the extent to which Ike was satisfied with the Interstate Highway
System produced under his administration, it is important to identify his priorities.

A number of historians have claimed that Ike’s primary motivation to construct the
Interstate Highway System emerged from the Cold War belief that roads were needed to mobilize
the country in the event of a third World War, and to evacuate major metropolitan areas in the
event of an impending nuclear strike. Historian Evan Thomas has claimed that the urgency with
which Ike professed the need for better roads, “was a sign of the times: he wanted more
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multilane highways to evacuate American cities in case of nuclear war.” 44 William Hitchcock has
made similar claims in his seminal work The Age of Eisenhower, stating how Ike “used the
specter of a nuclear attack to justify highway building, pointing out that evacuation of cities in
wartime required better roads.”45 Although there is some merit to this contention, there is little
surviving evidence in the form of Ike’s words or actions that supports it.
First, Cold War concern had already made its way into the federal highway discussion
before Ike mentioned it while serving as president. In the late 1940s, as relations between the
United States and the Soviet Union first began to deteriorate, Congress became more conscious
of the inability of the country's interstate system to sustain a possible remobilization.46 Anxiety
turned into action when Congress added a provision to the federal aid Highway Act of 1948 that
required the commissioner of public roads to join with the state highway departments and the
Secretary of Defense to produce a report on the potential needs of the interstate system for
purposes of national defense. It ultimately concluded that achieving such purposes would require
a “substantially more rapid improvement.”47 The fact that the highway construction effort had
been motivated by national defense needs far before Ike’s Presidency does not lend itself well to
the claim that Ike’s use of the angle was a clear “sign of the times” as Thomas and others have
suggested.
Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that national defense was as central to
Ike’s effort to construct the Interstate Highway System. When Ike first expressed his vision to
expand the Federal roadway system as president of the United States in a Business Advisory
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meeting in July 1953, not once did Ike invoke national defense to support his claim.48 Nor does
Ike mention national defense motivations in either of his personal accounts on his
administration--Mandate for Change and At Ease--in areas that discuss his effort for interstate
highways.49 Even publicly, Ike often chose to leave out the national defense argument from his
discussions of the need for highway construction, like on July 14, 1954, when multiple reporters
asked about it.50 Even when Ike did touch on national defense, he consistently incorporated it last
--and least, when they were ranked--in his arguments for better roads. In his State of the Union
speech to Congress on January 6, 1955, national defense was the last issue to be included in Ikes
plea for approval of an Interstate Highway Act. 51 About a month later, in a formalized message to
Congress, Ike identified the fundamental reasons behind the need for better roads. Written in
order from most to least pressing, national defense stood at the bottom of the list. Of the twelve
sentences dedicated specifically to explaining the need for better roads in Ikes 1956 State of the
Union address, only one sentence mentions national defense--again, at the end of a list of
reasons. National defense was certainly in mind when constructing the Interstate Highway
System, and Ike did invoke the argument in certain instances, particularly when trying to cajole
Congress for support of his bill. However, based on Ike’s rhetoric both public and private, it is
not clear that national defense was central to Ike’s understanding of the need for an Interstate
Highway System.
What is far more likely based on such evidence, is that Dwight Eisenhower’s belief in the
federal government's responsibility to construct and improve roads for the American people
derived from a genuine concern for their safety and well being. Chief among the reasons for
48
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highway construction in the previously mentioned lists was almost always the “personal safety”
of the American people. 52 With this, Ike was referring to the enormous number of deadly traffic
accidents that resulted from improper construction, maintenance, and regulation of America’s
roads every year. Accident data from the
Federal Highway Administration shows
the startling trend in motor vehicle
deaths, which had essentially been on a
constant rise through the 1920s and 30s
before plummeting during WWII. Since
then however, traffic deaths had been on
the rise once again; in the year Ike took office, traffic deaths hit their highest point since 1941, at
38,300.53
More than anything else, this trend forced Ike to act on the issue of road and highway
improvement. Even before his administration put forth any legislation on the subject of roads,
Ike had expressed his concern for the safety of the American people. In the same meeting in
which he left out the issue of national defense, Ike is quoted as saying he was, “tired of having
three to four times as many persons killed a year on the highways as were killed in Korea,” and
expressed that “when something is done on a coordinated basis the accident trend drops
sharply.”54 This effort did not stop once legislative deliberations began. On April 13th, 1954, Ike
formed the President's Committee for Traffic Safety, which continued to operate in order to
ameliorate the dangers of driving long after the campaign to push through highway legislation
52
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had passed, notably participating in the “Back the Attack on Traffic Accidents!” campaign in
1957.55 Ike also enthusiastically threw his support behind the first ever S-D (Safe Driving) Day
on December 15, 1954.56 His concern was reflected in his words to Congress when pushing for
the Interstate System. In his State of the Union Addresses in 1955 and 1956, improvement of
driver safety and reduction of accidents resulting in injury or death were the first issues he cited
when emphasizing the need for better roads.57 It was also given the highest priority in his written
message to Congress outlining the primary reasons for the necessity of the highway system.58 In
his later writings on his pursuit of Interstate Highways during his Presidency, Ike would recall,
“this was one of the things I felt deeply about, and I made a personal and absolute decision to see
that the nation would benefit by it.”59
Clearly, safety was chief among the reasons Ike thought the nation needed an improved
system of highways. But it was not the only one. Ike believed a massive federal undertaking
would be beneficial to the nation for economic reasons as well. He had specific ideas on how he
believed the Interstate Highway System ought to be funded, and how it was to be carried out.
These beliefs were integral to explaining the urgency and vigor with which Dwight Eisenhower
pursued highway legislation during his presidency.
Concerning Ike’s overall fiscal and state-rights policy Historian William Hitchcock has
this to say:
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In truth, Eisenhower was not a small-government conservative, although he
successfully sold himself as one to the public. He believed government should
create the conditions in which Americans could pursue their own ambitions. This
implied not a small or diminished government but an effective one. Good
government should deliver meaningful enhancements to citizens within the limits
of fiscal restraint.60
Hitchcock and others have termed this set of beliefs Ikes “Middle Way”61 between
small-government conservatism and Rooseveltian New Dealism. Yet, it would be hard to refute
the statement that President Eisenhower was more right than left of center on the political
spectrum. Stephen Ambrose, an authority on the Eisenhower Presidency, has noted how Ike
“liked to describe himself as a conservative on fiscal matters,”62 and Hitchcock himself concedes
that, “Eisenhower deeply believed in the conservative, small-government, balanced-budget
positions.”63 Thus, even historians have difficulty characterizing the political persuasions of our
nation’s 34th president. Ike’s actions while working on Interstate Highway legislation do nothing
to clear up that confusion.
Ike’s support for the highway bill suggests that he was not wholly a fiscal conservative.
Ike was outspoken in his belief that a complete overhaul of the existing road system, including
the addition of a brand-new 40,000 mile interstate system was necessary.64 Such a massive public
works project, “the biggest peacetime construction project of any description ever undertaken by
the United States or any other country,”65 according to Ike himself, would never have been
recommended by a true conservative. Eisenhower was perfectly comfortable with the projected
Federal cost of approximately 25 billion dollars to finance this construction, and even when
others warned him that the federal burden could be closer to twice that amount, he did not
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oppose the new numbers strongly enough to reassess his plans in any way. On July 14, 1954,
when a reporter wondered if $50 billion was necessary, Ike responded by saying, “I believe we
are at least $50 billion behind in our road networks... (and) we are ready to do our part in going
forward with this.”66
Fiscal conservatism certainly textured elements of Ike’s actions and ideology on the road
issue, however. Regarding financing for the Highway system, Ike observed that, “a sound
Federal Highway program can and should stand on its own feet with Highway users providing
the total dollars necessary for improvement in new construction.”67 Eisenhower worried about
uncontrolled federal spending and was reluctant to entrust initial planning for the program to
government bureaucrats.68 Thus, one of the reasons Ike took up the personal cause for highway
construction was precisely because of his fear that it would bloat the federal budget if anyone
else were to manage it. To finance the system, Ike also flashed his conservative side. Throughout
his presidency, Eisenhower remained adamant that whatever concessions he did make,
whichever highway program the nation adopted, it could not increase the national debt.69 The
debt was certainly of paramount importance to Eisenhower whenever funding was discussed.
This corresponded to his wider fiscal views. The President and his administration rejected
funding the project on a pay-as-you-go basis, and instead called for a self-financing system,
“based on the planned use of income from gas and diesel oil taxes, augmented in certain
instances by toll revenues.”70
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Ike wanted to be at the helm of the highway construction effort for fear of government
bureaucrats bloating the budget. He also believed the improvement of America’s roads was a
cost-saving construction project. Ike noted the “measurable economic cost of the highway
accident toll to the nation are more than 4.3 billion a year” in his official message to Congress in
February 1955 and how road improvement would not only save the American people from losing
their lives, but also their hard earned cash. Another side of this was the tremendous benefit to the
economy that would flow from a faster rate of modern modernization, and the need to “keep our
economy vigorous and expanding.”71
Ike also believed an improved highway measure would boost business for corporate
America. American industry had boomed in the immediate post-war years, and a substantial
increase in the number of Americans with disposable income allowed new markets to emerge for
a seemingly endless supply of consumer goods. Because of the rapid production required by the
Second World War, supply could meet demand. However, transportation efficiency was lagging
far behind production efficiency, largely due to the outdated and uncoordinated system of roads
and highways. Vice President Richard Nixon captured this idea in his speech to the Governor's
Committee in 1954 when he said, “Nullification of efficiency in the production of goods by
inefficiency in the transport of goods, is another result of this obsolete net that we have today.”72
With a modern network of interstate highways, however, it was theorized markets in rural areas
would open up and the time and cost associated with transportation would plummet. Clearly,
addressing this crisis was central to the Eisenhower Administration’s economic motivations for
better roads.
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Despite this, there were many elements of Ike’s road effort that would leave anyone
trying to cast him as a fiscal conservative scratching their heads. About a year after taking a hard
line against “the statism of the New Deal and its expensive federal programs”73 on the campaign
trail, Eisenhower and his economists endorsed a big jump and road spending. In doing this, they
hoped to “hitch the economy, in part, to a gigantic Public Works project.”74 They emphasized the
impact that job creation for engineers, planners, and construction workers would have on the
economy over the next ten years. Lucius Clay, a close personal friend and deputy of Ike during
the Interstate Highway effort, said as much in a letter to the President, expressing his hope that
state officials would “spend more money,” thus “pump priming”75 the economy. Amidst the
economic downturn that the nation was experiencing in the mid-1950s, Ike conceded in his 1956
State of the Union Address that, “public works activities are closely interrelated and have a
substantial influence on the growth of the country. Moreover, in times of threatening economic
contraction, they may become a valuable sustaining force.”76 In effect, Eisenhower and his staff
were devising a public works project not dissimilar in structure to those of the New Deal.

Ike’s Interstate Highway effort is an interesting case study to assess another element of
his wider policy on governance--delineation between state and federal rights and responsibility.
And in this case, the disparity between Ike’s actions and rhetoric blur his political leanings even
further than the fiscal issue.
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It has been said that, by the time Dwight Eisenhower assumed office, the issue between
state and federal responsibility on highway construction had been more or less agreed upon.77
While public support for federal control of the construction of transcontinental highways had
been growing since the late 1930s, there was still considerable difference of opinion over the
extent of federal-state matching of funds for all road projects, how driving related tax revenue
should be distributed, and the extent of involvement the federal government should have in the
planning and construction of interstate and non-interstate highways. Most of the history of road
construction in the United States had been the result of cooperative arrangements between the
federal and state governments concerning financing and construction responsibility and
oversight. The states had welcomed the creation of the Federal Bureau of Public Roads (BPR) in
1893 as a helpful tool to ensure the proper flow of traffic from one jurisdiction to another, in
exchange for a loss of power to plan routes and assign construction to particular firms. Between
1916 and 1940, most State governments had more or less accepted the cooperative arrangements
between the federal and state governments that BPR chief Thomas MacDonald had nurtured
throughout his tenure.78 Under MacDonald, this alliance allowed the states a large amount of
freedom to choose the location and construction of their roads--whether they be rural, municipal,
or highways. In MacDonald’s retirement speech in 1953, he noted that the acts carried out by the
BPR since “the original Federal Highway Act of 1916...recognize the sovereignty of the states in
the authority retained by the states to initiate projects.” And while MacDonald "appreciated the
need for a connected system of interstate highways,” he did not believe that “a separate national
system under a federal commission was the way to achieve it.”79
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What seemed like an acceptable state-federal power sharing arrangement to many soon
turned sour however. Beginning in the 1940s, many states began to question the need for federal
involvement in any public roads--especially after some realized there was money to be made. On
October 1st, 1940 the 160-mile Pennsylvania Turnpike was opened to traffic. For its time the
highway was the best of its kind, and would later be seen as the prototype of the modern
high-speed heavy-duty Interstate highway.80 Designed and constructed by the specifications of
the Pennsylvania legislature, the Turnpike was designed to be self-sufficient--covering the cost
of initial construction, maintenance, and improvements by charging a toll for drivers who used
the road. The scheme was a resounding success. After operating at a deficit for the interwar
years, the PA Turnpike began to turn a profit; by 1948 the Turnpike’s net operating revenue was
$5.6 million per year. The success of the PA Turnpike--as well as other Turnpike initiatives in
New Jersey and New Hampshire completed around the same time--would have consequences for
the federal-state relationship on the subject of roads. These Turnpikes operated at the discretion
of the State Toll road Authorities which did not receive federal funds and thus did not have to
secede any planning power or profit to the BPR or the Federal government. Learning from this
example, fifteen additional states created Toll road Authorities by 1952; by 1954, they had
collectively constructed 1382 miles of toll roads, and had plans to make more.81 Thus, at the time
of Ike’s first term, there was far from a clear consensus on the federal role in highway planning,
finance, and construction. In fact, there was rising sentiment against the principle of Federal Aid,
voiced by various speakers at the 1953 Governor's Conference who recommended that there be
no further increases in aid, and that the federal government withdraw from the taxation of motor
fuel. The strong indication from a number of states that they were well on their way to removing
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their worst traffic bottlenecks by building roads without federal assistance only furthered this
belief.82
In some respects Ike shared the concerns of these governors. Ike certainly seemed to be
on the same page as Governor Daniel Thorton and Governor Walter Kohler at their lunch on
January 21, 1953, the day after the President's inauguration. During their lunch, they discussed
the conflicts between federal and state taxes on the same products, such as gasoline, incomes,
and automobiles. Governor Thornton suggested that the federal government get out of these
fields of taxation, which he said traditionally belonged to the states. At the very least, it seems
that Ike did not outright reject the proposition. He was again conciliatory when speaking through
Vice President Nixon at the 1954 Governor’s Conference on July 12, when he asked the
Governors to form a committee that would work closely with the Administration to plan the
finance and construction of the Interstate System.83 Two days later, Ike continued along these
lines, explaining to a group of reporters that, “everybody to whom I have talked believes that we
should put the maximum authority and responsibility in the states that they are capable of
taking.”84 Ike continued to urge state sovereignty on the roads issue even after the monumental
1956 Act was passed, stating in a letter to Harlow H. Curtice, Chairman of The President's
Committee for Traffic Safety, that “the big and complex task of acquiring the necessary
rights-of-way, of designing, building and operating the highways” were “responsibilities that
belong primarily to the states themselves and their local communities.”85 Ike’s rhetoric on this
issue had a significant effect on persuading the nation’s governors to go along with his plan.
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Particularly significant was his speech at the 1954 Governors Conference which, according to a
contemporary observer, had an "electrifying effect" on the conference.86
It is evident that Ike’s words reassured the governors that he was on their side. However,
a careful analysis of Ike’s movements at this time should have hinted to states-rights
conservatives that this was an uneasy and imperfect agreement. In practice, President
Eisenhower actively restricted states’ access to road user taxes and their involvement in the
planning of road networks.
The first hint should have come when, in 1953, the Eisenhower Administration decided
to restructure the Federal Highway Authority, effectively forcing Thomas MacDonald out of his
tenured position as the Chief of the BPR. His farewell address, delivered in March 1953, outlined
his beliefs. In it, he emphasized the importance of continuing the traditional federal-state
partnership, and went on to state that the federal gasoline tax revenue should be returned to the
states as federal aid. By forcing MacDonald out of his position, the Eisenhower Administration
was subtly suggesting that they disagreed with these tenets, and that federal involvement in the
nation's highway system would grow.87
Within the contents of the Clay report lies more evidence that calls into question Ike’s
states-rights credentials. In order to draw up legislation to execute his ‘Grand Plan,’ Dwight
Eisenhower turned to able engineer, adept administrator, and close personal friend Lucius D.
Clay. Clay formed a committee that drew up legislation that would address the concerns of the
President on the mission for interstate highways.88 While the group’s report represented the
interests of Eisenhower, it did not necessarily represent those of the states, which was given only
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token representation in the group. Although the Committee was advised by a small Governor’s
Committee while making the plan, they included a provision that enabled the federal government
to receive a “share of the toll, even to the extent of an excess of what was necessary to cover
amortisation, from the toll roads built in the future.”89 The plan thus actively undermined the
goal of many states to eliminate the need for federal government funds through the use of toll
roads. State governors were also dismayed that the Clay Plan called for little change to the
distribution of funds to the gas tax while calling for a half-cent hike in the amount per gallon.
The President defended this proposal by stating that, “In the past, not all of this money had been
put out on road construction in matching funds with the states.”90 The new plan would eliminate
the federal government’s ability to divert road user funds to other projects. It would also reject
the right of states to have direct access and control over the revenue resulting from motor taxes.
The plan also sought to undermine state power in appropriating and directing federal funds to
highways by proposing the creation of the Federal Highway Corporation. The Corporation was
set up under the chairmanship of the Department of Commerce with the Secretary of the
Treasury, the commissioner of public roads, and another member of the Treasury department the states were given only token participation. The federal entity would design routes and
projects where it saw fit, and would have broad powers over the allocation and direction of
funds.91
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Concern over the direction the Interstate Highway System was going in the second half of
his presidency would show that Ike did want to preserve the rights and responsibilities of state
governments on the subject of roads in some capacity. However, the drastic disparity between
Ike’s rhetoric when reassuring states-rights advocates, and his actions behind the scenes while
trying to push through road legislation reveals Ikes belief that the Interstate System was to be
“authorized as one project”92 that should be primarily overseen by the federal government.

It was with those motivations and principles that Dwight Eisenhower embarked on a
daring mission to develop a cohesive national highway network. While his life experiences and
motivations suggest that the President would have liked to pursue highway legislation
immediately after gaining office, his first year was necessarily occupied by the Korean War.
Highways didn’t show up on his agenda until the following year.93 For the next two years,
however, the President would campaign fervently to get his ‘Grand Plan’ for 50 billion dollars
worth of self-liquidating highways through Congress and under construction. Eisenhower had
started with lofty goals, but he soon found that, in order to get even a shell of his original plan
passed, he would need to rely on teamwork and an immense amount of compromise. Between
April 1954 and July 1956, Dwight Eisenhower would have to solve the puzzle of how to fashion
a compromise between his interests, the interests of powerful members of Congress, and those of
a collection of people representing automobile, trucking, and other industries.
The first legislation passed under Eisenhower was a clear result of this compromise. Six
separate bills were proposed in the early months of 1954, all ranging between $800 to $900
million split between primary, secondary, urban, and interstate roads, to be financed on some
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level of federal-state matching basis. In the end, The Federal Aid Highway Act of 1954 passed
on June 26, 1954, providing $875 million in federal aid to primary, secondary, urban, and
interstate roadway systems, with the latter receiving $175 million to be used on a 60-40 matching
ratio.94 The act was a success--it had effectively codified the basic outline of the Federal
Interstate Highway System in the way Ike and many others had wanted it.95 Aided by a team of
cabinet members and experts including White House Chief of Staff Sherman Adams, Public
Works Advisor and former General John Stewart Bragdon, and the new Chief of the BPR Francis
DuPont, Ike had woken Congress up to the need for a renewed highway effort. However, this
success was only partial. Indeed, the Eisenhower Administration had to make significant
compromises in order to pass the bill, which did not come close to fully addressing its interests.
For one, the $875 million would not even account for one-twentieth of the total funds needed for
his original road plan. As for the financing mechanism, Congress avoided the President’s
recommendation to use toll roads on interstate highways, which Ike believed was the best way to
eliminate the risk of deficit spending on the project. In order to secure the approval of the states,
the bill also relinquished control over the spending of Federal-aid funds for secondary-road
projects, to which Ike was not entirely opposed but certainly did not anticipate. For these reasons
and more, the 1954 Federal Aid Highway act was to Ike’s merely “one effective forward step.”96
The most effective piece of this step was the Congressional request for a comprehensive study on
toll roads and the cost of completing the Interstate Highway System in the manner recommended
by the Administration. These studies were to be conducted by the BPR and other organizations
appointed and overseen by the Executive, giving Ike and his team a great deal of control over the
process.
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With the findings of the studies ordered by the 83nd Congress emerging in the final
months of 1954, Ike would have to develop a new team that could interpret the discoveries and
translate them into recommendations for legislative action on the Interstate Highway System.
This role was filled by the Clay Committee. Composed of Clay and four connected businessmen,
the committee received advice on a number of matters from multiple federal departments,
including the Department of Defense, the
Department of the Treasury, and the Bureau
of Public Roads, the Governor’s
Committee, and a small group representing
the concerns of the public.97 The group was
formed in August 1954, and completed
their report and submitted it to the
President by January, 1955. Clay’s
Committee called for an expenditure of
$101 billion over ten years, and forty-one
thousand miles of divided highways linking all U.S. cities with a population of more than fifty
thousand on a 70-25 matching basis with the states. After much debate within the Clay
Committee, the final plan chose not to use a system of toll highways to finance the project,
although it did specify that the Federal Government would receive a share of the toll from any
other toll roads built in the future as a small finance mechanism. Mostly however, the Clay Plan
suggested that the Federal Government issue bonds to pay for construction over a 10-year period
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and use revenue from the Federal excise tax on gasoline to retire the bonds.98 President
Eisenhower submitted the plan to Congress on February 22, 1955 expecting wide support - at
least from the Republican-controlled House of Representatives. However, the plan received only
token support in the House, and was decisively defeated in the Senate on May 25, 1955, by a
vote of 60 to 31.99
Prior to this, the President made several appeals to Congress as part of an overall effort to
win additional endorsements for the Clay program. On February 16, he invited Clay to the White
House to brief Senators William F. Knowland, H. Styles Bridges, and Eugene D. Millikan, and
Congressmen Charles A Halleck, Joseph W Martin, and Leslie C. Arends on the Plan in order to
highlight for senior Republicans the urgency of constructing the road network.100 A week later he
asked Clay, Adams, and other administration leaders to meet with the Senate and House public
works committees to do the same. Never, remarked Senator Chavez -- a ranking member of the
committee -- had the president called all members of the committee to the White House to
discuss domestic legislation. On Feb 21 he did just that for the sake of winning them over on the
Clay Plan.101 Since the summer of 1953, the President had also been working closely with state
Governors to ensure their support of the bill. By way of the address to the Governor’s committee
in 1954 and several private meetings with Governors going back to 1953, Ike had successfully
convinced most of them to support the Clay Plan, despite the measures contained within it that
seemingly went against their interests. The President had done this with such success that some
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of his aides reasoned that, with such strong support from State Governors, Congressmen who are
playing politics would succumb to political pressure.102
That assumption was incorrect. Disagreement emerged along party lines, as Democrats
vocalized their disapproval of the payment method by claiming that the bond proposal created a
hidden debt. Democratic Senator Harry Byrd, an influential member of the Finance Committee,
condemned Clay’s plan as “pork-barrel” politics, claiming that the Administration’s proposal had
been devised by members of the motor and construction industry for their own benefit.103 Other’s
disliked the idea of giving broad powers to the Highway Corporation, which was proposed by the
Clay Plan to oversee the further planning and construction of the Interstate Highway System and
had veto power over the BPR. At Congressional hearings, DuPont, Commerce Secretary Sinclair
Weeks, and Clay faced a “barrage of critical questions.”104
Many of the issues raised by Congressman mirrored those of special interest groups like
the American Highway Trucking Association, the Education Commission, and the Farmer’s
Union. The American Highway Trucking Association was not happy with the increase of the gas
tax and the introduction of a new tax on rubber which would finance some of the operation. As
early as January 1955, letters from the American Highway Trucking Association and the
National Association for motor bus operators made their way to the White House detailing their
disapproval of the Clay Plan and their demands for significant revisions. While these letters
insisted that Federal Highway Aid continue and that the federal government finance the interstate
system, it also demanded that there be no toll roads and no increase in federal excise on gas.105
The Farmer’s Union was less supportive of the effort as a whole, particularly disliking the
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emphasis placed on larger interstate roads and the lack of attention to farm roads, the funding for
which was frozen by the Clay Plan in order to divert funds to matters deemed more important.106
The Commissioner of Education was even less enthusiastic about the operation. Reports from
public works advisor John Bragdon reveal that the Education Commission “meant to oppose the
program vigorously,” on the grounds that, “the road program was going to take 70 billion of
funds from the states in the next 10 years and that this would use up all the money they had for
Education as well as roads.”107 Bragdon tried to assure the commissioner that this was
incorrect--the same level of funding had been reserved for education as years prior--yet he still
deemed the issue “of high importance,” and believed that “this entire matter (should) be brought
to the attention of the President.”108 All these special interest groups found outlets to voice their
concerns by lobbying Congressmen on both sides of the aisle, essentially dooming the bill upon
arrival.

Although the Clay Plan had failed, it laid the groundwork for what would become the
1956 Federal-Aid Highway Act. Representative George Fallon introduced a bill on April 19,
1956, which borrowed significantly from the Clay Plan. This bill was approved by the House just
one week after it was submitted. The Senate had completed its own version of the highway
legislation, introduced by Senator Albert Gore a year earlier, which it used to supplement the
Fallon bill along with modifications by Democratic Senator Byrd of Virginia. On June 26, 1956,
both the Senate and the House gave final approval to the compromise version and sent it to
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Eisenhower, who signed the legislation while recovering from an intestinal ailment at Walter
Reed Army Hospital three days later, June 29, 1956. 109
The bill President Eisenhower signed on that day was far larger than any road legislation
that had come before it. It had authorized $25 billion for the next twelve years to accelerate
construction for the project that had officially been named the National System of Interstate and
Defense Highways. To construct the highways, it would rely on private firms, who were required
by the Secretary of Labor to pay their workers the prevailing wage rates in the industry.110 To
finance the project, the legislation created the Highway Trust Fund, to be supported entriely with
highway user taxes which would be diverted directly and exclusively to highway spending.
These highway user taxes included an increase on gas and diesel fuel from 2 to 3 cents, a new tax
on rubber, and a newly imposed surcharge of $1.50 per thousand pounds on the total weight of
trucks heavier than 26k pounds.111 It gave the federal government more financing responsibility,
increasing the ratio of federal-state matching from 60-40 to 90-10. It also required that the more
than 40,000 miles of the Interstate Highway System be complete by 1962, built to the standard
capable of handling traffic projected for that year.112 By creating a fixed time for completion,
Congress had ensured that the Interstate System be complete as a single massive project.
The 1956 legislation was a mixed bag for President Eisenhower. On one hand, Ike had
successfully accomplished his goal to initiate the construction of a comprehensive network of
Interstate Highways under the primary oversight of the federal government. By requiring that
contractors working on the highway system be paid (at a minimum) the prevailing wage in the
industry, he had also achieved in incorporating pump-priming economic mechanisms into the
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public works project. Additionally, amidst the frenzy of the Act’s construction, Ike came across
to the American public as the great man in the middle. After the original failure of the Clay Plan,
an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune complained, “one suspects that the proposal's really
fatal flaw was that it was too good, that the opposition couldn't bear to help the President solve
the problem so cleanly and get the credit for it.”113 At the end of the 1955 Congressional session,
another paper praised the Eisenhower Administration for the “masterful job it has done on
getting across to the nation the demand for a first-class highway system. There is no longer any
serious argument, even in Congress, about the need.”114 At the end of the 1956 session, the
feeling was the same. Mark Rose notes that, “in speeches on the floor, Congressional leaders
ascribed their success to a sense of compromise and moderation”115 both among members of
Congress and those in the road transport and construction industries. A reporter writing on the
resulting compromise noted how “The unsavory political aura that hung over the bill since it was
first introduced by Congressman Fallon...cleared away amazingly fast as good roads advocates
on both sides of the aisle came to their feet in praise of the measure.”116
Eisenhower had indeed impressively orchestrated a compromise on the issue, for which
he deserves much credit. The distribution of funds between farm, urban, and truck roads, and for
interstate routes, was a fair compromise that eased some of the worries of those interest groups.
By easing up on the insistence to finance the project primarily through toll roads and issued
bonds, Ike was able to ease the worries of the Trucking Association enough to get them to accept
the increase in automotive tax, and even the surcharge of $1.50 surcharge per thousand pounds
113
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on trucks exceeding a weight limit. By establishing a Highway Trust Fund for all driver-related
taxes, the Act allowed for funds to be easily accessed as needed, and at the time seemed as if it
could feasibly finance the project on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis, which Ike also compromised on.
Although Eisenhower certainly did not orchestrate all of these compromises, he played a more
central role in the process than he is given credit for. For instance, following a January 31
meeting with congressional leaders, Eisenhower’s aides were told to “yield to Democratic
insistence on financing” and “cooperate in the development of an appropriate tax proposal.”117
He also told his staff that Senator Byrd, the most staunch critic of the Clay Plan, was to “be
consulted as to the most desirable procedures for expediting the bill.”118 Clearly, Ike was
personally invested in getting his plan into action, and to do so, he made a great deal of
compromises.
That being said, there is evidence to suggest that the President compromised too much in
certain areas, jeopardizing his goals for a streamlined highway system that wouldn't break the
budget. Not long after construction got underway did people begin to realize that the effort
would cost far more than expected. The original estimate produced by the Clay Committee of
$27.5 billion to complete the system, which had been referenced for the 1956 legislation,
actually had little basis in fact. By the end of the following year, Eisenhower’s Secretary of
Commerce Sinclair Weeks had found that a more accurate estimate was closer to $40 billion to
complete the system.119 By the end of the decade, the number had risen even further, to the point
where the Highway Trust Fund established by the 1956 Act would not provide the funds
necessary to finish construction close to the 1972 deadline. Even for the debt decrying President,
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this could not happen; the Trust Fund would need to be supplemented. In 1958, at the behest of
Senator Gore, the administration agreed to supplement the Trust Fund with money from the
general revenues by an additional $2.2 billion for three years with the Federal-Aid Highway Act
of 1958.120 Ike was not happy with this. If highway construction had been provided for by the
sale of bonds and toll revenue like he had initially ordered, all the money he needed would have
been available.121 But ultimately, this was the result of compromise, since Ike had to agree to a
"pay-as-you-go" policy in order to get any program in 1956. Ike signed the bill half-heartedly,
saying, “I approve this bill with serious misgivings because of certain of its provisions which I
regard as grave defects. Some of them could even create unfortunate precedents that may be
difficult to disregard in the future.”122 Ike had fought hard to uphold the policy of fiscal
responsibility that he believed in so dearly, but the 1956 bill had forced him to make concessions
for the sake of the American people’s wellbeing. Years later, Ike reflected how, “though I
originally preferred a system of self-financing toll highways...I grew restless with the quibbling
over methods of financing. I just wanted the job done.”123
Other issues with the 1956 legislation were not so excusable, and indeed stemmed from
Ike’s hands-off style of leadership. On how this tendency permeated Ike’s highway effort and
policy, Historian Tom Lewis has noted that:
While the president believed in teamwork, he cared little for details. Dwight
David Eisenhower would leave subordinates with this task. Others would have to
determine the relationship between a federal highway building program and the
states and how the country could afford new road construction and avoid a budget
deficit. Eisenhower would let others worry about the relationship between the
120
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proposed new highways and older cities, and how to compensate those whose
land was taken for construction. These were details and questions the president
never appeared to have considered even casually124
This examination has found this to be true. By ceding control over the Administration’s highway
legislation goals, Ike had written the Clay Committee a blank check of endorsement for any
plans they devised. The Clay Plan had laid the foundation for the 1956 Highway Act, including
the elements that took power away from the states. At the 1957 Governor’s Conference, Ike
condemned the fact that the federal government had "siphoned away state authority," which he
believed could not have happened "without the neglect, acquiescence, or unthinking cooperation
of the states themselves."125 He recalled that one of his earliest actions after taking office had
been to establish a Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, which had "pointed the way to
improvements in areas of mutual concern to the states and the federal government."126 In fact, Ike
had undermined the authority of this entity by flatly endorsing the Clay report.
Ike also stumbled by not carefully reading -- or at least not fully understanding -- the
proposed routes for the Interstate Highway System in the ‘Yellow Book’ produced by the BPR
and included in the Clay Plan. This book, which had “sold the program to Congress”127 in
practice had catastrophic effects on major cities, the ecological and quality of life effects of
which have been central to the dissatisfaction with the Interstate System ever since. In cities like
Boston and Washington D.C., where the book had shown highways cutting circular paths
through the center and outskirts of the cities, became “a concrete noose that promised to strangle
124
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the life from people and neighborhoods” when put in place.128 In San Francisco, the methodical
and efficiency-focused Yellow Book plan placing a large highway along the San Francisco
coastline failed to recognize that the project would cut off citizen’s access to the waterfront.129
Even worse, in cities like Chicago and Atlanta, plans for national highways cutting through these
cities created, “physical barriers for integration or to physically entrench racial inequality,” much
of which was by design.130
In a meeting with his Cabinet in the Spring of 1960, the President lambasted those who
proposed this measure, stating how “the matter of running Interstate routes through the congested
parts of the cities was entirely against his original concept and wishes.”131 However, Ike really
only had himself to blame. If he had “studied the Clay Committee report”132 as carefully as he
claimed he did, he probably would have seen the large pictures specifically outlining the road
routes, and could have made any adjustments he wanted.133 Even the extent of his endorsement
for the plan was not decided by himself. In a report by John Bragdon of a meeting on the Clay
Plan, it is described how the committee deliberated “whether (the plan) should be forwarded as
representing the President’s views, forwarded merely as informative, (or) not forwarded at all,”
before ultimately deciding that “the President should endorse the Clay report and forward it to

128

Tom Lewis, Divided Highways, p. 123.
Ibid.
130
Deborah Archer, interview by Noel King, “A Brief History Of How Racism Shaped Interstate Highways”
(transcript), National Public Radio (April 7, 2021), https://www.npr.org/transcripts/984784455
131
Ibid.
132
Ibid.
133
U.S. Department of Commerce & Bureau of Public Roads, General Location of National System of Interstate
Highways Including All Additional Routes at Urban Areas Designated in September 1955 (Washington D.C: GPO,
1955),
https://www.google.com/books/edition/General_Location_of_National_System_of_I/K8v8j10XXAUC?hl=en&gbpv
=1&printsec=frontcover
129

36
Congress.”134 Eisenhower had not even been present at the meeting, and it was this sort of
off-hand leadership that resulted in a miscarrying of his wishes.
Despite the financial, social, and ecological consequences of the Federal-aid Highway
Act of 1956, and the missteps by the President’s that contributed to them, no one can deny the
drastic changes the highway system made on the nation. As a result of the more than 40,000
miles of road that came from the legislation, Americans have an ease of transportation that would
have never been possible without it. The intangible value of our ability to freely travel across the
country to visit loved ones and explore the world cannot be lost in the discussion of the highway
system. The profound impact the highway system has on the economy, from the transportation of
consumer and industrial goods to one’s ability to commute to work safely and swiftly, are far
more tangible yet equally undeniable. And although an argument could be made that highway
construction actually decreased overall driver safety by increasing the speed of travel and
number of drivers on the road, it is not clear that there are any advocates of a return to the
uncoordinated, dilapidated system of roads that existed prior to the Interstate Highway System
on account of safety. Ike was ultimately unsatisfied with the way the highway system was
financed, and the way it was constructed in some areas. However, for these reasons and more,
historians have generally reached a consensus that the United States is better off with them than
without them.
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